

Chart A

Indeed, one rationale — sometimes with a
good deal of ^{experience behind it} ~~justification~~ ^{is for suppressing}
failing to convey the emergence of ^{(certain lower-level} "problems"
to higher authority is that the latter are
likely to react in panicky or inappropriate
~~and~~ counterproductive ways; i.e. ultimately it is
~~opposed~~ in the interest of system goals not to
provoke their intervention in certain "technical" crises.

~~Report~~

Annex B

~~Overview~~

¶ Of course, in undertaking to distort his own reporting or that of lower levels to his superiors, a subordinate is ~~sure~~ taking on some ^{new} personal risks; the greater these appear, the less net impulse to distortion. But in actual experience, these risks may appear very small: not only in comparison to the risks of frankness, but by any standard. One aspect of this calculation is that if in the Vietnam case, systematic distortions have occasionally come unequivocally to light, usually after a disastrous turn of events has in large part brought on by the very mis-reporting. Yet it would be difficult to point to a single bureaucratic career that has been worsened by the exposure of faulty reporting; whereas ^{many} scores of careers have been ruined precisely because individuals insisted on reporting truth as they saw it. We shall examine below the separate factors that bear on this weighing of personal risks in reporting; how they might be changed, to favor more accurate reporting, and what are the obstacles to such change.

2

Beauregard: I told de Letter in 1950, "You will
lose your reputation here, and you will lose
your health. He did not lose his reputation,
but he died."

After serving in Indochina in 1947-48, Beauregard
felt that, to sum, "It was necessary to do
everything right. You needed a hundred
signatures. And you needed political leadership
at home, which you couldn't control; e.g.,
statements by deputies, "When we leave ..."

(Signatures)

Beauregard

How to report failure.

2 May 64

"Frank... explained that the MRC had identified enormously complicated bureaucratic procedures based on older French procedures... and that those practices were being reformed. New regulations were about to go into effect, and it was hoped that they would improve the situation."

4CL
May 64 NCV trip: Encouraging sign. Khand was negotiating more US admissions: sign of good intentions, will to coop. with Americans.
[Khand to ~~Robert~~ Lodge, 4 May: "One American can make soldiers out of 10 Thais. We want in 'Army Corps' of 10,000 US SF. ... valley of North, suspension of civil rights 'as had been the case when Lincoln & your civil war.'"]

4CL

(135?)
Khand 23 new PC's + 50 new DC's had improved the quality of leadership."

- Harkin: "groundedly optimistic" in spite of above changes.